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ARBITRATION, EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL,
AND THE RIGHT TO INTERLOCUTORY
APPELLATE REVIEW
THEODORE J. HAWKINS†
INTRODUCTION
Based upon an arbitration clause, a nonsignatory to a
contract wants to compel a signatory to arbitrate a dispute. The
nonsignatory claims to be in privity with a party who did sign the
agreement. Can the nonsignatory immediately appeal a decision
by a federal district court refusing to compel arbitration and
ordering the parties to litigate their dispute?
Consider the facts of Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Provost, Colt
& Mosle, LLP: In that case, a large prosperous construction
corporation wanted to sell a small industrial equipment company
it owned.1 The corporation sought to make the highest possible
profit but pay the lowest possible taxes on the sale. To this end,
it consulted with a highly regarded accounting firm that advised
the corporation to invest in a tax shelter to minimize its exposure
following the sale.2 To help the construction corporation properly
execute the complicated tax shelter, the accounting firm enlisted
the help of a law firm and a financial services boutique.3
Although the financial services boutique signed an agreement to
arbitrate any disputes that might arise concerning its services,
the law firm and accounting firm signed no such agreement.4
Everything was going according to plan until the construction
corporation received a letter from the IRS explaining that the tax
shelter it invested in was “abusive” and illegal. Consequently,
†
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1
See Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 599
(6th Cir. 2008).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See id.
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the corporation had to pay $25 million in penalties to the IRS.5
The head of the construction company was furious and directed
his attorneys to sue the law firm and accounting firm in federal
court.6 Both defendants, wary of a large jury verdict, attempted
to have the case dismissed in favor of arbitration based upon the
construction company’s agreement with the financial boutique.7
The district court refused to allow the law firm and the
accounting firm to arbitrate the dispute and both firms sought an
immediate appeal.8 Does the law firm and accounting firm have
a right to an interlocutory appeal on the issue of arbitrability?
How should an appellate court handle such a complicated
question? For a long time circuit courts disagreed about whether
a nonsignatory had jurisdiction to appeal in this situation.9 This
narrow issue, however, was recently taken up and resolved by
the Supreme Court in Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle.10
Conflicts similar to the one described above arise as a result
of a steady increase in the use of commercial arbitration in
America over the last thirty years.11 Today, arbitration is a
popular alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) mechanism that
many companies, industries, and nations recognize as superior to
litigation. In 1976 at the “Pound Conference,” Chief Justice
Warren Burger gave his now famous speech advocating the
proliferation of arbitration and other ADR techniques in an effort
to upgrade an outdated legal system strained by litigation.12
Appealing to the legal community, Justice Burger praised
arbitration as a more efficient and fair conflict resolution
mechanism, that could be used to solve the problems of the
twenty-first century.13 “There is nothing incompatible[, he said,]

5

See id.
See id.
7
See id.
8
See id.
9
See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir.
2008) (acknowledging the “circuit split on [the] question of [interlocutory] appellate
jurisdiction”).
10
129 S. Ct. 1896, 1903 (2009).
11
See Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration
and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 105 n.2 (1997).
12
See Hon. Warren E. Burger, C.J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., Need of Systematic
Anticipation, Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7, 1976), in 70 FED.
RULES DECISIONS 79, 92–94 (1976).
13
See id.
6
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between efficiency and justice.”14
Many corporations favor
arbitration, not only because it is efficient and inexpensive, but
also because arbitration decisions are confidential,15 and the
parties have the ability to appoint an arbitrator who is an expert
in the subject matter of a contract.16
Just as Justice Burger advocated, the use of arbitration has
steadily expanded since 1976.17 Today, it has become a dominant
mechanism through which international commercial disputes
are resolved,18 as well as the chosen method used to resolve
consumer19 and securities disputes.20 Despite proliferation in
some areas, there is still widespread resistance to the use of
arbitration by “large sophisticated actors” in the United States.21
In a study of 2,800 contracts executed by publicly held companies
in 2002, it was determined that only eleven percent of the
agreements contained arbitration clauses.22 The authors of the
study reasoned that “[t]he paucity of such clauses may partially
reflect the view of corporate counsel that the decision . . . to
include binding arbitration in an agreement is not one that can
be made across the board, but rather depends on the needs and
circumstances of the parties.”23
One of the least attractive aspects of an arbitration
proceeding is the lack of appellate review.24 Although this
negative attribute can be offset by both parties’ ability to choose
14

Id. at 92.
William F. Fox, How To Think About International Commercial Dispute
Resolution, SN056 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 455, § 2.02(a)(4) (2008).
16
Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse
Preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 259 (2005).
17
See Levin, supra note 11.
18
Eric Bergsten, The Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 289, 300 (2005) (“By 2005, the American business and legal
communities accepted arbitration as the preferred method of settlement of
international commercial disputes.”). Contra Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration
Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 350,
351 (2007) (finding that only twenty percent of international contracts contain
arbitration clauses).
19
See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 18, at 373.
20
See Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining
Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities Arbitration, 26 PACE L.
REV. 113, 113 (2005).
21
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 18, at 335.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 368.
24
See id. at 340.
15
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an arbitrator with expertise in the subject matter of the contract,
the lack of appellate review could be a deal breaker for
corporations that frequently enter into complicated commercial
deals where large sums of money are at stake. Even if litigation
costs substantially more than arbitration, companies that have
deep pockets may simply be unwilling to forgo the opportunity to
overturn an unfavorable verdict.25
In addition, a related
difference between arbitration and litigation is the perception
that jury verdicts are statistically higher than arbitration
awards.26 Given the potential drawbacks to arbitration, it is easy
to see why the threshold issue of arbitrability can turn into a
contentious dispute if it is unclear whether the parties entered
into an agreement to arbitrate.
One type of dispute that has emerged in the last decade
involves the issue of arbitrability interwoven with the concept of
equitable estoppel. This category is primarily made up of
contract disputes between corporations in which a nonsignatory
to the contract is either attempting to compel arbitration or being
compelled to arbitrate.27 Such controversies exist because of the
increasing complexity of business organizations in our time.28
For example, attached to many multinational parent
corporations are labyrinths of corporate entities that are wholly
owned, partly owned, or merely weakly associated with the
parent company. This organizational structure can lead to
uncertainty as to who is bound by an arbitration agreement
signed by a particular corporate entity.29

25

See Charles E. Buffon & Joshua D. Wolson, Antitrust Arbitration Counseling,
19 ANTITRUST 31, 33 (2004) (discussing why the inability to appeal an arbitration
decision might discourage arbitration of a large antitrust claim).
26
See Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47
S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 198 (2005).
27
See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc., v. Residuos Industriales Multiquim, S.A. de C.V.,
372 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2004).
28
See id. A nonsignatory sought to stay the litigation of a dispute pending the
outcome of an arbitration proceeding involving the same issue. See id. The
controversy arose because it was unclear whether the former parent company or the
purchaser of smaller company was responsible for a debt resulting from the breach
of an equipment lease. See id.
29
See, e.g., Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 43 (1st
Cir. 2008) (discussing the arbitrability of claims against a nonsignatory subsidiary
and corporate officers).
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In general, arbitration agreements are enforceable only if
they are in writing.30 However, arbitration can also be compelled
through the concept of equitable estoppel. An equitable estoppel
issue can arise when only one of the parties to a dispute signed a
written arbitration agreement and, based upon that agreement,
either the signatory or the nonsignatory seeks to compel the
other party to arbitrate.31 In this situation the party seeking to
compel arbitration asserts that it is unfair for its adversary to
deny the existence a written agreement. The standard for
determining whether equitable estoppel applies differs depending
upon which party is attempting to compel arbitration.32
Although it is commonly accepted that a signatory can compel a
nonsignatory to arbitrate a dispute, only recently has law
developed that permits a nonsignatory to compel a signatory to
arbitrate a dispute.33 This Note will focus only on situations in
which a nonsignatory seeks to compel a signatory to arbitrate.
Recently, in Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, the Supreme
Court resolved a split between the circuits dealing with this very
issue.34 The court decided that § 16 of the FAA gives federal
appellate courts jurisdiction to review an interlocutory appeal
when a litigant appeals from an order denying a stay in litigation
in favor of an arbitration, regardless of whether the litigant
signed a written arbitration agreement or not.35 Before the
decision, federal circuit courts disagreed whether a nonsignatory
had the right to appeal an order by the district court refusing to
compel arbitration.
One group of circuits held that a
nonsignatory could not appeal such a decision because the
Federal Arbitration (FAA) required a written arbitration
agreement as a prerequisite to the appeal.
These courts
reasoned that because the nonsignatory did not sign a written
30
Rojas v. TK Commc’n, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The FAA
requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing.” (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 n.1 (1991)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
31
See, e.g., Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Provost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597
(6th Cir. 2008).
32
See Thompson-CSF v. AAA, 64 F.3d 773, 776–79 (2d Cir. 1995).
33
See Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir.
2000) (“Other circuits have, in a few instances, allowed a non-signatory to a contract
with an arbitration clause to compel arbitration under an equitable estoppel theory,
including when the action is intertwined with, and dependent upon, that contract.”).
34
129 S. Ct. 1896, 1903 (2009).
35
See id.
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arbitration agreement, it was precluded from asserting that such
an agreement existed and therefore could not appeal. Holding to
the contrary, the Second and Fifth Circuits decided cases that
allowed nonsignatories to appeal. These circuits based appellate
jurisdiction on the strength of the nonsignatories’ equitable
estoppel claim. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Arthur
Anderson, explained that under the “clear and unambiguous”
language of § 16 of the FAA, any litigant who asks the court to
compel arbitration and is denied is entitled to an immediate
appeal.36
This Note will examine the controversy between the circuits
and discuss how the Supreme Court reconciled the competing
viewpoints with the plain language of the FAA. Part I will
discuss the law of equitable estoppel and how it is applied when
arbitration is at issue. Part II will address the cases leading up
to the Supreme Court decision. Finally, Part III will analyze the
Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Anderson and recommend
that both the policy and the law favor a bright-line rule allowing
interlocutory appeals by parties seeking to arbitrate through
equitable estoppel.
I.

THE USE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL TO COMPEL PARTIES TO
ARBITRATE

Traditionally, equitable estoppel is a defense available to a
promisee when the promisor wrongfully denies the existence of a
contract that the promisee relied upon. Equitable estoppel is a
principle firmly grounded in fairness, which has evolved from
humble beginnings.37 In the the Supreme Court’s decision in
Carlisle, equitable estoppel was used as a mechanism to resolve a
dispute in which one party did not sign a written agreement to
arbitrate. There, notwithstanding that fact that none of the
defendants signed an agreement, they claimed that it was

36

Id. at 1898.
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.11, at 39 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2010) (1981) (“[M]ore and more we are seeing
these equitable doctrines come forward to achieve justice and fair dealing between
[individuals]. The literal constructionists live by the letter of the contract—they
recognize nothing which is not expressed. Estoppel did not arise, like the mists of
creation; it was born out of conscience and embodied in the law to right wrongs.”
(quoting Roseth v. St. Paul Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 105, 110–11 (S.D.
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
37
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unjust not to allow them to arbitrate their claims.38 Equitable
estoppel “is designed to prevent injustice by barring a
party . . . from taking a position contrary to his prior acts,
admissions, representations, or silence.”39 In essence, equitable
estoppel exists to prevent a party from “trying to have his cake
and eat it too; that is, from ‘rely[ing] on the contract when it
works to [his] advantage [by establishing the claim], and
repudiat[ing] it when it works to [his] disadvantage [by requiring
arbitration].’ ”40
Put another way, in some circumstances,
fairness dictates that a party can be precluded from asserting the
lack of a written agreement as a defense against a motion to
compel arbitration.
It is “generally accepted that in the context of a motion to
compel arbitration, federal law controls the issue of equitable
estoppel.”41 Although the FAA requires that an arbitration
agreement be in writing,42 the Supreme Court has held that an
arbitration clause is no different than any other contract

38

MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 13:8 (2010)
(“Equitable estoppel allows a party to be estopped from repudiating a contract on
which the other party has relied and as a result of which the other party has
changed its position so that it will suffer an injury if the contract is repudiated.”).
Equitable estoppel differs from the concept of promissory estoppel. See Tiffany Inc. v.
W. M. K. Transit Mix, 493 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Ariz. 1972) (“[T]he major distinction
between equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel is that equitable estoppel is
available only as a defense, while promissory estoppel can be used as a cause of
action for damages . . . . [E]stoppel is a shield, not a sword, hence it forms no basis
for a cause of action for damages in contrast to promissory estoppel which gives rise
to a cause of action for damages.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 90 (1981).
39
Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 205 So. 2d 35, 40 (La.
1967).
40
Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist P.C., 412 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(quoting In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971, 976 (11th Cir.
2002)).
41
Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Application of Equitable Estoppel
Against Nonsignatory To Compel Arbitration Under Federal Law, 43 A.L.R. FED. 2d
275 § 3 (2010). Moreover, issues of arbitrability should always be decided by a court
rather than an arbitrator. See id. Equitable estoppel can be either a question of law,
a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact, depending on the
circumstances. See 31 C.J.S. ESTOPPEL AND WAVIER § 291 (2010). In general, “where
the facts are undisputed and only one inference may be drawn . . . the question of
estoppel is one of law, but otherwise it is one of fact.” Id.
42
Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The FAA
requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in writing.”).
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language.43 Thus, the same common law equitable defenses
developed in contract law are available to parties seeking to
enforce an arbitration clause.44
The application of equitable estoppel to arbitration
agreements initially led to the “development of legal and
equitable principles whereby a nonsignatory to an arbitration
agreement [could] be compelled to arbitrate based upon implied
consent.”45 Such situations arose when a party that signed an
arbitration agreement sought to compel arbitration against a
party that did not signed the agreement. Subsequently, an
alternative doctrine emerged permitting nonsignatories to
compel signatories to arbitrate based upon equitable estoppel in
limited situations.46 Although a signatory almost always has
standing to bring a suit compelling a nonsignatory to arbitrate, it
is much less certain whether a nonsignatory has standing since
its connection to the contract is much less certain. Nevertheless,
courts have found that a nonsignatory may compel a signatory to
arbitrate when there is a “close relationship between the entities

43
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(finding that general contract law defenses may be applied to invalidate an
arbitration agreement); J. Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial, III, Equitable Estoppel
as a Basis for Compelling Nonsignatories To Arbitrate—A Bridge Too Far?, 21 REV.
LITIG. 593, 594 (2002).
44
See Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776–79 (2d Cir.
1995).
45
Uloth & Rial, supra note 43, at 594; see also Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 776–79.
These traditional theories originated from prior Second Circuit Decisions. See, e.g.,
Fisser v. Int’l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 241 n.6 (2d Cir. 1960). In Thomson-CSF, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals summarized five “traditional” contract theories
through which a signatory could compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate:
(1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3) agency, (4) veil piercing/alter ego,
and (5) estoppel. See Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 776–79. According to the Second
Circuit, a signatory can compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate based upon an
“incorporation by reference” theory when the two parties “entered into a separate
contractual relationship . . . which incorporates the existing arbitration clause.” Id.
at 777. Similarly, a signatory can compel arbitration under an “assumption” theory
when a nonsignatory “manifest[s] a clear intention to arbitrate” by, for example,
sending a representative to the arbitration proceeding. Id. In addition, arbitration
can be compelled under a “veil-piercing/alter-ego” theory when “a parent corporation
and its subsidiary . . . demonstrate[ ] a virtual abandonment of separateness.” Id. at
777–78. Moreover, “[t]raditional principles of agency law may bind a nonsignatory to
an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 777. Finally, principles of equitable estoppel can be
used to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate when it is clear that the nonsignatory
had an agreement in fact to accept arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.
Id. at 778.
46
Rosenhouse, supra note 41, § 4.
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involved” and the claims are “intimately founded and
intertwined” with the terms of the contract.47 Since the right to
compel arbitration is contractual in nature, a nonsignatory
agent, successor, or third party beneficiary may have standing to
compel arbitration based upon equitable estoppel.48 Generally, in
cases decided in favor of allowing a nonsignatory to compel
arbitration, the nonsignatory “has a contractual or other business
relationship with [a] nonadverse party to the arbitration
agreement, giving the non-signatory an obvious interest in the
success of the agreement between the two signatories.”49 The
limited situations in which a nonsignatory can estop a signatory
from denying the existence of an obligation to arbitrate can be
broken down into three broad relational categories: (1) when the
nonsignatory has a financial stake in a nonadverse signatory;
(2) when a nonsignatory is the purchaser of goods from a
signatory; and (3) when a nonsignatory provides goods and
services to a signatory.50 Examples of each of these situations are
discussed below. These examples are illustrative of the types of
controversies and parties that were affected by the Supreme
Court’s decision.
Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.51 is a case
that falls into the first relational category—it involves claims by
a nonsignatory that had a financial stake in a signatory. In that
case, a soft drink producer entered into a licensing agreement
with a subsidiary of another soda producer to “market and sell an
orange soda under the ‘Sunkist’ brand name.”52 The licensing
agreement contained a broadly worded arbitration clause.53
Following the execution of the licensing agreement, the
47
Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757–58 (11th
Cir. 1993); see also Denney v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2005).
48
See Rosenhouse, supra note 41, § 2.
49
Id.
50
See generally id. (outlining the rights of particular nonsignatories to compel
arbitration of a signatory’s claim under a theory of equitable estoppel).
51
Sunkist Soft Drinks, 10 F.3d at 756–57.
52
Id. at 755.
53
Id. The license agreement stated:
[A]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or
the breach thereof, including those regarding termination or failure to
renew this Agreement, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the
award rendered by the Arbitrators may be entered in any Court having
jurisdiction thereof.
Id.
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subsidiary was acquired by Del Monte, a second beverage
company, and stripped of its employees and management.54
Sunkist promptly sued Del Monte alleging tortious interference
with the licensing agreement and Del Monte, although a
nonsignatory to the licensing agreement, sought to stay the suit
and compel arbitration based on the same agreement.55 Del
Monte successfully argued that because Sunkist’s claims were
essentially contractual in nature, it was “fundamentally unfair”
to allow the beverage company to frame its causes of action as
sounding in tort and thus avoid its contractual obligation to
submit its claims to arbitration.56
The district court was
convinced that Sunkist was “actually suing to enforce provisions
of the licensing agreement” and consequently referred the claims
to arbitration.57 Sunkist attempted an interlocutory appeal,
which was denied for lack of jurisdiction under § 16 of the FAA.58
After the arbitration proceeding, Sunkist again sought to appeal,
and this time the court upheld jurisdiction.59 The Eleventh
Circuit found that Del Monte could compel Sunkist to arbitrate
its claims because the claims were “intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract obligation.”60 The court
reasoned that arbitration was proper because Sunkist’s claims,
although sounding in tort, alleged that the nonsignatory
beverage company violated the license agreement.61 And, since
the subsidiary “ceased operating” and was absorbed into the
beverage company upon its purchase, the beverage company was
bound by the subsidiary’s agreement as a matter of law.62
Like Sunkist, Thixomat v. Takata Physics International Co.63
also involved a subsidiary. However, Thixomat falls within the
second relational category because the dispute in that case arose
from an agreement made concurrently with the sale of goods.
54

Id.
Id. at 755–56.
56
Del Monte Corp. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1:186-cv-1583-RLV,
1988 WL 415059, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 1988).
57
Id. at *2.
58
Sunkist Soft Drinks, 10 F.3d at 756. The court did not discuss the reason for
the denial of appellate jurisdiction, and there is no written opinion concerning the
issue. See id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 757–58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61
See id. at 758.
62
Id.
63
No. 01 Civ. 5449(RO), 2001 WL 863566 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2001).
55

2011]

INTERLOCUTORY APPELLATE REVIEW RIGHTS

11

There, a company that owned a patent for metal molding
technology and sold machines utilizing the technology entered
into a sales agreement with Takata, a Japanese corporation.64
The contract provided for the purchase of several of the molding
machines.65 It included both an arbitration clause and a clause
stating that the molding technology was confidential.66 When
Takata leased the molding machines to Takata Physics, a wholly
owned subsidiary, a dispute arose about whether the
confidentiality provision in the original licensing agreement had
been breached.67 An arbitration proceeding was initiated, but
Thixomat, the signatory, moved to stay the arbitration, arguing
that it had not agreed to arbitrate with the subsidiary.68 The
district court held that Thixomat could be compelled to arbitrate
the dispute with the nonsignatory subsidiary.69 It reasoned that
because of the close relationship between the subsidiary and the
parent company, the fact that both entities sought an identical
remedy and because the claims arose “from one common nucleus
of operative facts,” they were “intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract obligations” and had to
be referred to arbitration.70
Palmer v. Conseco Finance Servicing Corp.71 is a case that
falls into the third relational category because it involves claims
by a nonsignatory that provided goods and services to a
signatory. There, mortgagors brought an action against both a
bank that refinanced their home and a life insurer that denied
their life insurance claim.72 The suit was the result of a joint
mortgage and life insurance deal gone awry.73 Before they
brought the lawsuit, the mortgagors executed a promissory note
to refinance their home and used some of the money to take out a
life insurance policy with a life insurance company owned by the

64

See id. at *1–2.
Id. at *1.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at *3.
70
Id. The court also noted that the fact that an arbitration proceeding had
already been initiated and the fact that the conflict was international in nature were
additional factors that moved the court to rule in favor of arbitration. Id. at *4.
71
198 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Miss. 2002).
72
Id. at 823.
73
Id.
65
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mortgagee bank.74 Although the mortgagor paid the premiums to
the mortgagee bank, the bank hired another company, American
Bankers Life Insurance, to actually insure the life.75 When one of
the mortgagors died, American Bankers, the nonsignatory,
refused to pay, claiming that the mortgagors made
misrepresentations on their application.76 The court granted
American Banker’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a
clause in the promissory note even though American Bankers,
the insurer, never signed that agreement.77 The court stated that
since the mortgagors alleged that the mortgagee bank acted as
an agent for American Bankers and since the mortgagor plaintiff
alleged “interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the
nonsignatory Defendants and the signatory [lenders],” the claims
were sufficiently intertwined to compel arbitration.78
II. INTERLOCUTORY APPELLATE REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
ORDERS
Section 16 of the FAA governs appellate review of all court
orders concerning arbitration.79 The framework of the statute
reflects the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.80 “Its
inherent acknowledgment is that arbitration is a form of dispute
resolution designed to save the parties time, money, and effort by
substituting for the litigation process the advantages of speed,
simplicity, and economy associated with arbitration.”81 In line
with this goal, § 16 denies a litigant the ability to immediately
appeal when the court compels arbitration82 but permits an
74

Id.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 825–26.
78
Id.
79
William G. Phelps, Annotation, Appealability of Order Staying, or Refusing To
Stay, Proceeding in Federal District Court Pending Arbitration Procedure, 110 A.L.R.
FED. 148 (1992). Prior to the enactment of § 16 on November 16, 1988, courts applied
the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine to appeals from orders concerning arbitration. See
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 284, 287 (1988)
(overturning the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine in the wake of the merger between courts
of law and equity).
80
See 15B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.17 (2d ed. 2010); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
81
David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, Appeals from Arbitrability
Determinations, in 9 U.S.C.A. § 16 (West 2010).
75

82
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immediate appeal when the court refuses to compel arbitration.83
Specifically, the statute provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken
from . . . an order . . . refusing a stay of any action under section
3 . . . [or] denying a petition under section 4 of this title.”84 Thus,
§ 16 gives a party seeking to compel arbitration more avenues to
seek appellate review than a party trying to avoid arbitration,
reflecting the policy of the FAA to encourage arbitration.85
Enacted as part of the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, § 16 was a small piece of a much larger effort by
Congress to overhaul the federal court system and allow it to
cope with the enormous caseload overflowing its dockets.86 The
only legislative history concerning § 16 is a brief summary of its
purpose articulated by members of the House of Representatives:
“[I]nterlocutory appeals are provided for when a trial court
rejects a contention that a dispute is arbitrable,” however,
“appeals are specifically prohibited . . . when the trial court finds
that the parties have agreed to arbitrate [the dispute].”87

Except as otherwise provided in § 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be
taken from an interlocutory order—(1) granting a stay of any action under
§ 3 of this title; (2) directing arbitration to proceed under § 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under § 206 of this title; or (4) refusing to enjoin
an arbitration that is subject to this title.
9 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006).
83

An appeal may be taken from—(1) an order—(A) refusing a stay of any
action under § 3 of this title, (B) denying a petition under § 4 of this title to
order arbitration to proceed, (C) denying an application under § 206 of this
title to compel arbitration, (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an
award or partial award, or (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award.
Id. § 16(a).
84
Id.
85
See Siegel, supra note 81.
86
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 1, at 22 (1988). In urging his fellow
congressmen to vote for the bill, Representative Kastenmeier stated,
Enactment of court reform legislation is similar to creating a quilt. The
entire fabric of our system of justice is woven piece by piece through the use
of State and Federal courts, traditional litigation and alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms. This bill solidifies the tapestry of American justice
by strengthening the Federal and State court systems and by encouraging
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. I urge my colleagues
to support the bill.
134 CONG. REC. 31,871 (1988).
87
H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 1, at 36–37.
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Since its enactment, courts have applied § 16 in a variety of
ways,88 sometimes reaching “puzzling” conclusions.89 Recently, a
disagreement has arisen between the circuits over the grant of
appellate jurisdiction when a nonsignatory seeks to compel
arbitration based on equitable estoppel.90
The disagreement involves the references made by § 16 to § 3
and § 4 of the FAA.91 Section 4, which gives the court the power
to compel arbitration, contemplates a dispute involving “an
agreement in writing for arbitration.”92 Similarly, § 3, which
empowers the court to stay proceedings on application from one
of the parties, requires an “issue referable to arbitration under
an agreement in writing.”93 Relying on these references to a
written agreement, the D.C. Circuit and Sixth Circuit ruled that
a nonsignatory seeking to compel a signatory to arbitrate a
dispute could not appeal an order by a district court mandating
litigation because there was no written agreement between the
parties.94 The Fifth and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals,
however, took the opposite position, reasoning that the writing
requirement was met when it appeared that the nonsignatory
has a meritorious equitable estoppel claim.95
At its core, the circuit split existed because courts were
unclear how to reconcile the idea of equitable estoppel with the
language in § 16 of the FAA that permits interlocutory appeals.
In the cases that made up the circuit split, the nonsignatory used
88

See, e.g., Cerveceria Cuauhtemoc Moctezuma S.A. v. Mont. Beverage Co., 330
F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2003) (appellate jurisdiction was dependent upon the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate).
89
15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 80, § 3914.17 (stating that the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Cerveceria Cuauhtemoc Moctezuma S.A. v. Montana Beverage Co. was
“puzzling” because the court erroneously reasoned that the gateway jurisdictional
question of arbitrability depended upon the merits of the case).
90
See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 44–45 (1st Cir.
2008) (acknowledging the “circuit split on [the] question of [interlocutory] appellate
jurisdiction”).
91
“An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . refusing a stay of any action
under section 3 . . . [or] denying a petition under section 4 of this title . . . .”
9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).
92
Id. § 4.
93
Id. § 3.
94
See Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallett-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 601–
02 (6th Cir. 2008); Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practice Litig. v. Sprint
Commc’ns Co., 428 F.3d 940, 942–43, 945 (10th Cir. 2005); DSMC, Inc. v. Convera
Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
95
See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Residuos Industriales Multiquim, S.A., 372 F.3d 339, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2004).
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equitable estoppel as an “offensive sword” rather than its
traditional role as a “defensive shield” to assert that the
signatory could not deny the existence of a written arbitration
agreement.96
Appellate courts found this use of equitable
estoppel difficult to reconcile with the language of § 3 and § 4,
which seem to require a “written agreement for arbitration” or an
“issue referable to arbitration” as a prerequisite to interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction. The circuits disagreed as to whether the
writing requirement was met when a claim was based on
equitable estoppel.
A.

The Circuit Split Leading up to Arthur Anderson

The D.C. Circuit was one of the first courts to bar an
interlocutory appeal by a nonsignatory seeking to compel
arbitration through equitable estoppel.97 In DSMC Inc. v.
Convera Corp.,98 Judge Roberts,99 writing for the D.C. Circuit,
applied § 4 of the FAA narrowly. According to Judge Roberts, § 4
“applies only to an ‘alleged failure . . . to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration’—not an alleged failure to
arbitrate when principles of equitable estoppel indicate that you
should.”100
The facts of DSMC were complicated.101 The case involved a
contract dispute that arose out of the alleged theft of trade
secrets.102 Initially, NGTL, a division of National Geographic
Magazine, contracted with DSMC, a company providing digital
cataloging services, to create a digital database for thousands of
hours of video.103 The contract included a broadly worded
arbitration clause and a provision protecting DSMC’s proprietary
right to its software.104 Dissatisfied with performance, NGTL
fired DSMC and hired Convera Corporation, a competitor. “To
96
Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 45, 56 (1996).
97
See generally DSMC, 349 F.3d 679.
98
Id.
99
Hon. John G. Roberts Jr. currently serves as Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. He was appointed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
2003, the same year he authored the opinion in DSMC.
100
DSMC, 349 F.3d at 683.
101
See Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallett-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597,
600–01 (6th Cir. 2008).
102
DSMC, 349 F.3d at 681.
103
See id.
104
See id.
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facilitate the switch,” NGTL gave Convera a copy of the database
created by DSMC.105
Subsequently, DSMC initiated an
arbitration proceeding against NGTL pursuant to their
agreement and sued Converain federal court, alleging copyright
infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets.106 Convera
then sought to compel arbitration based on the agreement
between NGLT and DSMC. However, the district court refused
to grant Convera’s motion..107 It reasoned that DSMC’s claims
against Convera were not “inextricably intertwined with the
contract” because regardless of NGLT’s breach of its “contractual
obligation to maintain confidentially[,]. . . Convera’s obligation to
DSMC . . . [did] not arise out of that contract, but rather from
state and federal statutes and common law.”108 The district court
explained in dictum that if DSMC had alleged a more overt
contract law claim—like tortious interference with the contract—
the court would have been more willing to grant a motion to
compel
arbitration.109Since
DSMC’s
claims
were
for
misappropriation of trade secrets and civil conspiracy, its motion
to compel arbitration was denied.110 The district court also
denied a motion made by NGTL to stay the litigation between
DSMC and Convera.111 It reasoned that a motion to stay should
be granted according to the court’s discretion, and “the simple
fact that [the same] issues may be resolved in both fora” is not a
sufficient reason to stay litigation.112
The interlocutory appeal to the D.C. Circuit concerned two
issues and involved all three parties. First, NGTL, which was a
signatory to the agreement but not a party to the lawsuit,
petitioned the court to stay litigation pending the outcome of the
arbitration proceeding between itself and DSMC.113 In addition,
Convera, the nonsignatory defendant, sought to compel DSMC to

105

See id.
See id.
107
See id. at 681–82.
108
DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 14, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2002).
109
See id.
110
See id.
111
See id. at 30–31.
112
Id. at 30.
113
DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2003), abrogated
by Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).
106
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arbitrate its claims based on the agreement between DSMC and
NGTL. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the issues raised on appeal by NGTL and Convera.114
Roberts based his decision primarily on the plain language in
§ 16 of the FAA. He first looked at § 16, which incorporates § 4
by reference.
Section 16 specifically permits interlocutory
appeals taken “from an order denying a petition under section 4”
of the FAA.115 Roberts then examined § 4 of the FAA, which
“applies only to an ‘alleged failure . . . to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration.’ ”116 Because DSMC never
signed an arbitration agreement with Convera, and its appeal
was based on “principles of equitable estoppel,” Roberts reasoned
that the “written agreement” requirement was not met, and
consequently, DSMC could not establish jurisdiction for its
interlocutory appeal.117 The court similarly concluded that there
was no jurisdiction to immediately appeal NGTL’s motion to stay
litigation pending the outcome of an arbitration proceeding.118
Since the motion was based on equitable estoppel, the D.C.
Circuit reasoned that there was no arbitration agreement and
thus, no “issue referable to arbitration.”119
In support of his new rule concerning the application of
equitable estoppel to interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, Roberts
reasoned that it was best to have “bright-line” jurisdictional rules
concerning the application of equitable estoppel rather than to
engage in a “multifactor factual and legal inquiry to determine
whether the issues to be litigated . . . are sufficiently intertwined
with the issues subject to arbitration.”120 Roberts also correctly
stated that interlocutory appeals generally are infrequently
granted.121
There are readily apparent holes in the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning in DSMC. It is quite unclear whether plain language
of § 3 and § 4 of the FAA denies nonsignatories the right to stay
litigation or compel arbitration. Language referencing a “written
agreement” and an “issue referable to arbitration” is not ironclad
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 681–82.
Id. at 682 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 683 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
Id. at 683–84.
See id. at 684–85.
Id. at 684.
See id. at 683–84.
See id. at 683.
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evidence that Congress intended to preclude nonsignatories from
immediately appealing arbitrability questions. In addition, the
court’s policy argument that a bright line rule is preferable to a
multifactor inquiry is misleading. Although bright line rules are
preferable when jurisdiction is at issue, it does not directly follow
that there should be a bright line rule preventing interlocutory
appeals. Finally, although it is true that interlocutory appeals
are infrequently granted, § 16 of the FAA explicitly permits a
party to immediately appeal an order refusing to compel
arbitration because of the the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration.
In contrast to the approach taken in DSMC, the Fifth and
Second Circuits decided that it is sometimes permissible for a
nonsignatory to immediately appeal a refusal to compel
arbitration.122 To come to this conclusion, both circuits looked to
the merits of the nonsignatories’ equitable estoppel claims to
decide whether they were parties to an arbitration agreement.
They reasoned that appellate jurisdiction should be granted
when the facts of a case clearly demonstratethat the
nonsignatories claims were in fact “inextricably intertwined”
with the underlying contract obligation.123
Although this
approach allowed the appellate court to correct erroneous factual
findings by the district court, it also blurred the line between the
gateway jurisdictional question and the equitable estoppel issue.
Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction and the merits of the
equitable estoppel claim can be difficult to separate in practice.
It is hard to refuse interlocutory appellate jurisdiction when it is
obvious that the district court committed a substantive error by
refusing to acknowledge a nonsignatory’s legitimate equitable
estoppel claim. This was the problem faced by the Fifth Circuit
in Waste Management, Inc. v. Residuos Industrailes Multiquim,
S.A. de C.V.124 In that case, Waste Management (“WM”) was the
original parent company of a corporation called RIMSA.125 To
provide collateral for RIMSA to lease heavy equipment from The
Bethlehem Corporation, WM provided Bethlehem with a letter of

122
See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Residuos Industrailes Multiquim, S.A. de C.V., 372 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir.
2004).
123
See Ross, 478 F.3d at 99.
124
372 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2004).
125
See id. at 340.
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credit worth $795,000.126 After executing the letter, WM sold its
majority stake in RIMSA to Onyx through a stock purchase
agreement which included a “broad agreement to arbitrate.”127
Unfortunately for WM, after the transfer, RIMSA defaulted on
its obligation to pay for the equipment it leased from Bethlehem,
and Bethlehem responded by exercising its right to collect on the
letter of credit.128 WM was forced to pay Bethlehem the $795,000
allocated in the letter.129 Not surprisingly, WM sued RIMSA for
Around the same time Onyx initiated an
the balance.130
arbitration proceeding against WM on unrelated claims and
WM’s claim for reimbursement of the $795,000 became an issue
in that matter.131 As soon as the issue of reimbursement became
part of the arbitration proceeding, RIMSA, a nonsignatory to the
arbitration agreement between WM and Onyx, sought to stay
litigation with WM pending the arbitration outcome.132 The
district court denied the stay and RIMSA appealed.133
The Fifth Circuit found that RIMSA, a nonsignatory, had
jurisdiction for its immediate appeal to enforce the stay.134 To
reach this conclusion, the court examined the question from an
entirely different perspective than the D.C. Circuit used in
DSMC.135 The Fifth Circuit stated that the issue of appellate
jurisdiction is essentially “identical to the substance of this
interlocutory appeal.”136 Thus, the court ruled that the language
in article 3 requiring an “issue referable to arbitration under a
written arbitration agreement” only required that the issues to
be litigated were bound up with the issues to be arbitrated.137
The court found that because WM’s claims against RIMSA were
126

Id.
Id.
128
See id.
129
See id.
130
See id. at 341.
131
See id. at 340–41.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 340.
134
Id.
135
See id. at 342.
136
Id. at 343.
137
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit expresses three
factors used to determine whether a nonsignatory can invoke § 3 and consequently
have jurisdiction for an appeal: “(1) the arbitrated and litigated disputes must
involve the same operative facts; (2) the claims asserted in the arbitration and
litigation must be ‘inherently inseparable’; and (3) the litigation must have a ‘critical
impact’ on the arbitration.” Id.
127
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“identical” to WM’s claims against Onyx, interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction was appropriate.138 The Fifth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to stay litigation.139
By completely ignoring even the possibility that § 16 imposed
a writing requirement through § 3, the Fifth Circuit was able to
reach a just result relying solely on the merits of the
nonsignatories’ equitable estoppel claim. Although the outcome
of the case was just, since the issues referred to arbitration were
in fact “identical” to the issues to be litigated, the court’s
reasoning was questionable. The Supreme Court has established
that a party’s right to appeal “cannot depend upon the facts of a
particular case.”140 Rather, it is the role of an appellate court to
address issues of law. The Fifth Circuit crossed the line by
relying on the merits of the case to decide a jurisdictional issue.
However, under the D.C. Circuit’s rule discussed above, DSMC,
the nonsignatory in Waste Management, would have been
categorically denied an appeal and forced to litigate while the
exact same issues were decided in a parallel arbitration
proceedings.
This could force the nonsignatory to endure
conflicting obligations if the arbitrator and jury reached opposite
conclusions. Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile the Fifth
Circuit’s problematic rule with the just result reached in Waste
Management.
At its core, the circuit split boiled down to whether the goals
of the FAA were best served by assigning a narrow meaning to
§ 16 that created a bright line rule barring appeals by
nonsignatories or whether the FAA’s strong federal policy
favoring arbitration supported a broader interpretation allowing
appeals. This choice is especially difficult to make because ruling
on the issue of equitable estoppel in the context of arbitration is a
138
Id. at 344. The court examined the merits RIMSA’s application for a stay and
reasoned that because there was “[f]undamentally . . . one dispute,” namely,
“[w]ho . . . should reimburse WM for the $795,000,” the litigation and arbitration
were “inherently inseparable,” and thus, there was an issue “referable to
arbitration” under § 3 of the FAA, and consequently interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction under § 16. Id. at 345.
139
Id. at 346.
140
See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996) (“In any event, the question
before us here—whether there is jurisdiction over the appeal, as opposed to whether
the appeal is frivolous—must be determined by focusing upon the category of order
appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order.
‘Appeal rights cannot depend upon facts of a particular case.’ ” (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 354 U.S. 394, 405 (1957)).
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decision that straddles the line between substance and
procedure. Considered broadly, when an appellate court rules on
the issue of equitable estoppel, it is simply deciding whether the
parties agreed to submit to arbitration, a function over which
appellate courts explicitly have jurisdiction.141 However, when
considered in a different light, deciding the issue of equitable
estoppel can be viewed as “delv[ing] deeply into the merits of
[the] case,”142 which cannot be undertaken until after the
threshold issue of arbitrability has been decided.143
III. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN ARTHUR ANDERSON
As briefly discussed above, Arthur Anderson was a case
about abusive tax shelters.144
The plaintiffs were three
businessmen who wanted to sell their construction equipment
businesses. They purchased advice from an accounting firm, a
law firm, and a financial services boutique about how to
minimize their taxes following the sale.145 Collectively, the law
firm, accounting firm, and financial services botique advised the
construction company to execute a tax shelter strategy that the
Internal Revenue Service later found to be illegal. The tax
shelter, called a “leveraged option strategy,” was “designed to
create illusory losses” through investment in foreign-currency
exchange options.146 Although the IRS initially offered immunity
for these kinds of tax shelters, none of the defendant advisors
informed the businessmen of this option, and the plaintiffs were
forced to pay $25 million in penalties for using the shelter.147
Although the financial services boutique was the only advisor
that signed an arbitration agreement with the contruction
company, the law firm and accounting firm nevertheless sought
to stay litigation and compel arbitration based upon that
agreement.148 The district court denied their motion and the
defendants took an interlocutory appeal to the Sixth Circuit. The
141

AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
143
AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649–50.
144
Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1899 (2009).
145
Id.
146
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147
See Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallett-Provost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 599
(6th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Arthur Anderson, 129 S. Ct. 1896.
148
Id.
142
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circuit court denied jurisdiction and adopted the reasoning of the
D.C. Circuit in DSMC that appellate jurisdiction should be
denied unless a litigant has signed a written arbitration
agreement.149 The Sixth Circuit quoted Judge Roberts, who
stated that, “to the extent possible, clear, predictable, bright-line
rules . . . [should] be applied to determine jurisdiction with a fair
degree of certainty from the outset.”150 In fact, the vast majority
of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion was borrowed from the D.C.
Circuit’s reasoning in DSMC.151
In the Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Scalia began his
analysis of the jurisdictional issue by explaining that the FAA
provides an exception to the general rule that appellate courts
only have jurisdiction over district courts’ “final decisions.”152
Scalia then goes on to decide the case in two sentences: under
the “clear and unambiguous” language of § 16, “any litigant who
asks for a stay under § 3 [of the FAA] is entitled to an immediate
appeal from denial of that motion—regardless of whether the
litigant is in fact eligible for a stay . . . .Because each [litigant] in
this case explicitly asked for a stay[,] . . . the Sixth Circuit had
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial.”153 Thus, the
Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by taking a middle
ground; it created a bright-line rule allowing interlocutory
appeals by litigants seeking to arbitrate claims based on
equitable estoppel. The Court took issue with both sides of the
circuit split. Scalia criticized the lower courts for “conflating the
jurisdictional question with the merits of the appeal;”154 the
merits question, according to the Court, is irrelevant and should
only be dealt with “after the court has accepted jurisdiction over
the case.”155 The Court went on to reject the Sixth Circuit’s rule
that a litigant is “categorically ineligible for relief” by virtue of
the fact that they did not sign a written arbitration agreement.156
The court regarded the rule as an artificial statute of frauds that
had no basis logical connection § 16 of the FAA. Section 16 states
149

See id. at 600–01.
See id. at 601 (quoting DSMC, Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 683 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
151
See id. at 600–01.
152
Arthur Anderson, 129 S. Ct. at 1900 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 1901.
156
Id. at 1902.
150
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that “[a]n appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . refusing a
stay of any action under section 3 of this title.”157 In turn, § 3
contemplates an issue that is “referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing.”158 The Court explained that since § 2 of
the FAA governs the enforceability of arbitration agreements, if
an agreement is binding under § 2, it is enforceable under § 3.159
To determine whether an agreement is enforceable under § 2,
state contract law must be consulted.160
And “[b]ecause
traditional principles of state law allow a contract to be enforced
by or against nonparties to the contract through . . . estoppel,” a
nonparty does not have to meet a writing requirement to appeal
an order refusing to stay litigation under § 16.161 Finally, Scalia
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that allowing these kinds of
appeals will lead to frivolous appeals. According to Justice
Scalia, sanctions are an appropriate remedy in those cases.162
The dissenting option authored by Justice Souter and joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Stevens is short but direct.
Souter argued that the “firm congressional policy against
interlocutory or piecemeal appeals” favors reading § 16 and § 3
together to create a writing requirement for litigants seeking an
interlocutory appeal based upon estoppel.163 According to Justice
interlocutory appeals are “a matter of limited grace” and can be
extraordinarily disruptive to the litigation process.164 Therefore,
it follows that a writing requirement should be implemented as a
matter of policy to “limit the scope” of appeals by nonsignatories.
Justice Souter contends that this measure is necessary to
“mitigate[ ] the risk of intentional delay by savvy parties who
seek to frustrate litigation by gaming the system.”165

157

9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (2006).
Id. § 3 (emphasis added).
159
See Arthur Anderson, 129 S. Ct. at 1901–02.
160
See id. at 1902.
161
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
162
See id. at 1901.
163
Id. at 1903 (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
164
Id. at 1904.
165
Id.
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Analysis

The congressional intent of § 16 of the FAA is quite clear:
“[I]nterlocutory appeals are provided for when a trial court
rejects a contention that a dispute is arbitrable under an
agreement of the parties and instead requires the parties to
litigate.”166 Contrary to the dissenting opinion’s assertion that
§ 16 is a limited grant of jurisdiction and should be narrowly
construed, the statutory intent found in the congressional record
suggests that Congress envisioned a much broader exception for
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction when a district court refuses
to compel arbitration.167 A broad exception similarly comports
with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.168 Although
Justice Scalia does not examine the legislative history, he
reaches the same result by invoking the plain meaning of § 3 and
through principles of contract law. Scalia is right on the law. It
is an established principle of contract law that “an obligation to
arbitrate” can still “attach” when a party has not “personally
signed the written arbitration provision.”169 If both a signatory
and a nonsignatory should be bound by an arbitration agreement
as a matter of law, it stands to reason that either party should be
able to immediately appeal an incorrect district court decision
holding otherwise.
However, as Scalia himself acknowledges, “[w]hen the reason
for a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.”170 The dissenting
opinion in Arthur Anderson implies that taking an interlocutory
appeal from an order refusing to compel arbitration is a delay
tactic employed by defendants to “wear down the opponent”
through a “lengthy” appeals process. No doubt that was the
reason the rule was employed in the Arthur Anderson case.
There, the two parties seeking the appeal were the law firm and
166

H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 37 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,

5997.
167
“By providing a party who seeks arbitration with swift access to appellate
review, Congress acknowledged that one of the principle benefits of arbitration,
avoiding the high costs and time involved in judicial dispute resolution, is lost if the
case proceeds in both judicial and arbitral forums.” Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing,
LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004).
168
See 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 80, § 3914.17; see also Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
169
Fisser v. Int’l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 1960).
170
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF
PERSUADING JUDGES 30 (2008) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510 (West 2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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accounting firm. Both businesses were being paid to provide tax
advice, yet failed to discover that the tax scheme they
recommended had become illegal. Even further, they failed to
realize that the IRS was offering safe harbor for companies who
embarked on the scheme.171 Therefore,he law firm and the
accounting firm each had a motive to delay litigation in an effort
to get the plaintiffs to settle. In this particular situation, a
writing requirement makes sense—the district court should
definitively decide which forum should be employed and the
parties should move to the merits instead of squabbling over
procedure.
Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion fails to grasp an
important reason for allowing litigants to appeal the district
court’s decision to refuse to grant a stay—the possibility of
inconsistent results. Besides the threshold decision concerning
where the merits of a dispute should be vetted, § 3 of the FAA
also deals with motions to stay litigation pending the outcome of
arbitration proceeding already in progress. Most cases in which
one litigant is seeking to compel arbitration through equitable
estoppel also involve another party who has signed an arbitration
agreement and will arbitrate the dispute. If the litigant seeking
to arbitrate through equitable estoppel is denied a stay, it is
possible that the results between the litigation and the
arbitration proceeding will be inconsistent.172 This is the main
reason why appellate courts tied the question of jurisdiction to
the merits of the equitable estoppel claim. Therefore, both the
policy and the law favor a bright-line rule allowing interlocutory
appeals under § 16 of the FAA.
CONCLUSION
In the end, Justice Scalia resolved the circuit split by
imposing a rule that categorically favors arbitration over
litigation. Thus, a company that did not even sign an arbitration
agreement with its adversary can now appeal an unfavorable
decision by a trial judge to hear its lawsuit in court. Considering
the purpose of the FAA, which is to reduce the size of the federal
docket, this conclusion seems logical.
Nevertheless, it is
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See Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1899 (2009).
See, e.g., Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757–
58 (11th Cir. 1993).
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important to recognize that as the complexity of agreements
subject to arbitration continues to grow, so will the intricacies of
the disputes concerning who can enforce the clause. In light of
the overarching goal of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms to promote efficiency, it is paramount that courts
adopt the most simple and efficient means of resolving these
fights.

